Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information
Ensaios Economicos Working Paper No. 359
Posted: 23 Mar 2000
Date Written: October 1999
Abstract
We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games with incomplete information and continuous contributions. We consider contribution and subscription games. We show that every equilibrium is inefficient. We also provide a sufficient condition for 'contributing zero' to be the unique equilibrium of the contribution game with n players and characterize equilibria of the subscription game involving positive contributions.
JEL Classification: D79, D89, H89
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Monteiro, Paulo Klinger and Menezes, Flavio M. and Temimi, Akram, Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information (October 1999). Ensaios Economicos Working Paper No. 359, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=209371
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