Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction

21 Pages Posted: 30 Jun 2012

See all articles by Björn Bartling

Björn Bartling

University of Zurich - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Ernst Fehr

University of Zurich - Department of Economics

Klaus M. Schmidt

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: June 21, 2012

Abstract

In Bartling, Fehr and Schmidt (2012) we show theoretically and experimentally that it is optimal to grant discretion to workers if (i) discretion increases productivity, (ii) workers can be screened by past performance, (iii) some workers reciprocate high wages with high effort and (iv) employers pay high wages leaving rents to their workers. In this paper we show experimentally that the productivity increase due to discretion is not only sufficient but also necessary for the optimality of granting discretion to workers. Furthermore, we report representative survey evidence on the impact of discretion on workers’ welfare, confirming that workers earn rents.

Keywords: high-performance work systems, wages, discretion, gift exchange, job satisfaction

JEL Classification: M5, J3

Suggested Citation

Bartling, Björn and Fehr, Ernst and Schmidt, Klaus M., Discretion, Productivity, and Work Satisfaction (June 21, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2096838 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2096838

Björn Bartling

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Ernst Fehr

University of Zurich - Department of Economics ( email )

Blümlisalpstrasse 10
Zuerich, 8006
Switzerland
+41 1 634 3709 (Phone)
+41 1 634 4907 (Fax)

Klaus M. Schmidt (Contact Author)

Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich (LMU) - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Ludwigstrasse 28
Munich, D-80539
Germany
+49 89 2180 3405 (Phone)
+49 89 2180 3510 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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