How Membership in the European Union can Undermine the Rule of Law in Emerging Democracies

Abstract

The European Union (EU) considers the spread of economic prosperity and democracy to countries emerging from dictatorship among its primary goals when considering countries as candidates for membership. The standard argument suggests that EU membership confers significant benefits on the accession countries, and these countries are willing to undergo costly and difficult reforms to reap these benefits. Through strict membership conditions, member states force accession countries to commit to democracy. This argument, however, downplays the difficulties accession countries face in implementing the changes required of them. This paper seeks to challenge the conventional wisdom that enlargement is always good for the enlargement country. Drawing on theoretical work in the fields of law and economics, we will argue that, under certain conditions, the reforms required of would-be members could actually have the perverse effect of undermining the establishment of legitimate law in transitional democracies. The "rule of law'' is undermined by placing laws on the books that create perverse incentives or are near impossible to implement.