Dividends as Reference Points: A Behavioral Signaling Approach

59 Pages Posted: 16 Jul 2012

See all articles by Malcolm P. Baker

Malcolm P. Baker

Harvard Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Jeffrey Wurgler

NYU Stern School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 15, 2012

Abstract

We outline a dividend signaling approach in which rational managers signal firm strength to investors who are loss averse to reductions in dividends relative to the reference point set by prior dividends. Managers with strong but unobservable cash earnings separate themselves by paying high dividends but retain enough earnings to be likely not to fall short of the same level next period. The model is consistent with several features of the data, including equilibrium dividend policies similar to a Lintner partial-adjustment model; modal dividend changes of zero; stronger market reactions to dividend cuts than increases; relative infrequency and irregularity of repurchases versus dividends; and a core mechanism that does not center on public destruction of value, a notion that managers reject in surveys. Supportive new tests involve nominal levels and changes of dividends per share, announcement effects, and reference point currencies of ADR dividends.

Keywords: dividend, signaling, Lintner, repurchase, behavioral signaling

JEL Classification: G35

Suggested Citation

Baker, Malcolm P. and Wurgler, Jeffrey A., Dividends as Reference Points: A Behavioral Signaling Approach (July 15, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2108401 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2108401

Malcolm P. Baker

Harvard Business School ( email )

Boston, MA 02163
United States
617-495-6566 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.people.hbs.edu/mbaker

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Jeffrey A. Wurgler (Contact Author)

NYU Stern School of Business ( email )

Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street, Suite 9-190
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
212-998-0367 (Phone)
212-995-4233 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.stern.nyu.edu/~jwurgler/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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