Estimating Equilibrium Effects of Job Search Assistance

47 Pages Posted: 28 Jul 2012

See all articles by Pieter A. Gautier

Pieter A. Gautier

Free University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Paul Muller

University of Gothenburg

Bas van der Klaauw

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Tinbergen Institute

Michael Rosholm

Aarhus University - Department of Economics and Business Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Amternes og Kommunernes Forskningsinstitut (AKF)

Michael Svarer

Aarhus University - Department of Economics and Business Economics; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

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Abstract

Randomized experiments provide policy relevant treatment effects if there are no spillovers between participants and nonparticipants. We show that this assumption is violated for a Danish activation program for unemployed workers. Using a difference-in-difference model we show that the nonparticipants in the experiment regions find jobs slower after the introduction of the activation program (relative to workers in other regions). We then estimate an equilibrium search model. This model shows that a large scale role out of the activation program decreases welfare, while a standard partial microeconometric cost-benefit analysis would conclude the opposite.

Keywords: randomized experiment, policy-relevant treatment effects, job search, externalities, indirect inference

JEL Classification: C21, E24, J64

Suggested Citation

Gautier, Pieter A. and Muller, Paul and van der Klaauw, Bas and Rosholm, Michael and Svarer, Michael, Estimating Equilibrium Effects of Job Search Assistance. IZA Discussion Paper No. 6748, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2119055 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2119055

Pieter A. Gautier (Contact Author)

Free University of Amsterdam ( email )

Amsterdam, ND North Holland
Netherlands

Tinbergen Institute Amsterdam (TIA) ( email )

Gustav Mahlerplein 117
Amsterdam, 1082 MS
Netherlands

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Paul Muller

University of Gothenburg ( email )

Box 640
Vasagatan 1, E-building, floor 5 & 6
Göteborg, 40530
Sweden

Bas Van der Klaauw

VU University Amsterdam - Department of Economics ( email )

De Boelelaan 1105
1081 HV Amsterdam
Netherlands
+31 20 444 6120 (Phone)
+31 20 444 6005 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Tinbergen Institute

Burg. Oudlaan 50
Rotterdam, 3062 PA
Netherlands

Michael Rosholm

Aarhus University - Department of Economics and Business Economics ( email )

Fuglesangs Allé 4
Aarhus V
Denmark
+45 89 42 15 59 (Phone)
+45 86 13 63 34 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Amternes og Kommunernes Forskningsinstitut (AKF)

Nyropsgade 37
Copenhagen, DK-1602
Denmark

Michael Svarer

Aarhus University - Department of Economics and Business Economics ( email )

Universitetsparken
Building 350
DK-8000 Aarhus C
Denmark
+45 8942 1598 (Phone)
+45 8613 6334 (Fax)

Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Schaumburg-Lippe-Str. 7 / 9
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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