Overbilling and Informed Financial Consent -- A Contractual Solution

New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 476, No. 5, p. 396, August 2012

2 Pages Posted: 9 Aug 2012

See all articles by Barak D. Richman

Barak D. Richman

Duke University School of Law; CERC, Stanford Univ. School of Medicine; George Washington University - Law School

Mark A. Hall

Wake Forest University - School of Law

Kevin A. Schulman

Duke University - Medical Center

Date Written: August 2, 2012

Abstract

U.S. hospitals and physicians regularly charge uninsured patients and patients receiving care outside their health-plan networks far more what most health insurers pay and far more than their actual costs. Such practices have triggered over 100 lawsuits and prompted calls for pricing transparency in Congress and price regulation in several states. This Perspective argues that the theory of implied contracts, a foundation in most first-year courses in contract law, offers a useful legal and ethical mechanism for handling these troubling problems in health care billing.

Suggested Citation

Richman, Barak D. and Hall, Mark A. and Schulman, Kevin A., Overbilling and Informed Financial Consent -- A Contractual Solution (August 2, 2012). New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 476, No. 5, p. 396, August 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2126794

Barak D. Richman (Contact Author)

Duke University School of Law ( email )

210 Science Drive
Box 90362
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7244 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)

CERC, Stanford Univ. School of Medicine ( email )

United States

George Washington University - Law School ( email )

2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States

Mark A. Hall

Wake Forest University - School of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 7206
Winston-Salem, NC 27109
United States
336-716-9807 (Phone)

Kevin A. Schulman

Duke University - Medical Center ( email )

100 Fuqua Drive
Durham, NC 27715
United States

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