Seeking Legitimacy through CSR Reporting: Evidence from China

Posted: 14 Aug 2012 Last revised: 12 Jun 2017

See all articles by Narisa Tianjing Dai

Narisa Tianjing Dai

University of International Business and Economics - Business School

Fei Du

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Accountancy

S. Mark Young

University of Southern California - Leventhal School of Accounting

Guliang Tang

University of International Business and Economics

Date Written: September 28, 2016

Abstract

This study finds that Chinese firms that issue high-quality corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports are perceived as having greater legitimacy (operationalized by government endorsement and media endorsement) by the Chinese government and media. Chinese firms that issue higher quality CSR reports subsequently receive higher levels of government endorsement and media endorsement, which in turn lead to better financial performance. The positive relationship between the quality of a firm’s CSR disclosure and subsequent financial performance is mediated by the firm’s perceived level of legitimacy. The mediating role of government endorsement is stronger for firms based in underdeveloped regions.

Keywords: corporate social responsibility, disclosure quality, legitimacy, government subsidy, media coverage, financial performance

JEL Classification: M41 G14 G18 G30

Suggested Citation

Dai, Narisa Tianjing and Du, Fei and Young, S. Mark and Tang, Guliang, Seeking Legitimacy through CSR Reporting: Evidence from China (September 28, 2016). Journal of Management Accounting Research, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2128936 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2128936

Narisa Tianjing Dai

University of International Business and Economics - Business School ( email )

10, Huixin Dongjie
Changyang District
Beijing, Beijing 100029
China
0086-1064493525 (Phone)

Fei Du (Contact Author)

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - Department of Accountancy ( email )

1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
United States

S. Mark Young

University of Southern California - Leventhal School of Accounting ( email )

Los Angeles, CA 90089-0441
United States
213-740-4848 (Phone)
213-747-2815 (Fax)

Guliang Tang

University of International Business and Economics ( email )

No. 10, Huixin Dongjie, Chaoyang District
Beijing, 100029
China

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
1,140
PlumX Metrics