On Moral Philosophy and Kinds of Human Actions

John Keown (ed.), Reason, Morality and Law: The Jurisprudence of John Finnis (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012)

17 Pages Posted: 5 Sep 2012 Last revised: 14 Sep 2012

Date Written: September 4, 2012

Abstract

A discussion of Finnis vs. Anscombe on the specification of human actions. Against Anscombe, it is proposed that moral philosophy is needed prior to establishing the specification of actions in the field of philosophy of mind. In a way that complements what John Finnis has written on this topic, the view is defended that moral virtues are needed and moral evaluation does enter into the specification of types of actions, albeit not — as Finnis rightly contends — in the descriptions of actions for the purpose of such specification. Aquinas and Aristotle help to explain this paradox, which is needed to understand why names such as "sodomy" or "injustice" can be used in a purely descriptive, non evaluative way, as Anscombe does; a way that does not preclude the question about their goodness or badness as species of human actions.

Keywords: action, specification, moral philosophy, Anscombe, Finnis

Suggested Citation

Orrego, Cristobal, On Moral Philosophy and Kinds of Human Actions (September 4, 2012). John Keown (ed.), Reason, Morality and Law: The Jurisprudence of John Finnis (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2141493

Cristobal Orrego (Contact Author)

Universidad Católica de Chile ( email )

Chile
56-2-3542964 (Phone)

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
129
Abstract Views
869
Rank
397,421
PlumX Metrics