Dynamic Pricing, Procurement, and Channel Coordination with Stochastic Learning

35 Pages Posted: 8 Sep 2012

See all articles by Xiuli He

Xiuli He

University of North Carolina at Charlotte

Tao Li

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

Suresh Sethi

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management

Date Written: September 6, 2012

Abstract

We consider a decentralized two-period supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a product and sells it through a retailer facing a price-dependent demand. We assume that the second period production cost declines linearly in the first-period production, but with a random learning rate. As the mean and/or the standard deviation of the learning rate increase, the traditional double marginalization problem becomes more severe, leading to greater efficiency loss in the channel. We obtain revenue sharing contracts that can coordinate the dynamic supply chain. We study the effect of the revenue sharing rate on the wholesale prices in each of the two periods and on the splitting of the total supply chain profit between the channel members. Finally, we examine the impact of the mean and the standard deviation of the learning rate on the pricing strategies of the channel members, on the retailer’s procurement decisions, and on the structure of the revenue sharing contracts.

Keywords: Learning curve, learning-by-doing, pricing, inventory management, channel coordination, revenue sharing contracts

JEL Classification: C61

Suggested Citation

He, Xiuli and Li, Tao and Sethi, Suresh, Dynamic Pricing, Procurement, and Channel Coordination with Stochastic Learning (September 6, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2143382 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2143382

Xiuli He

University of North Carolina at Charlotte ( email )

9201 University City Boulevard
Charlotte, NC 28223
United States

Tao Li

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )

P.O. Box 830688
Richardson, TX 75083-0688
United States

Suresh Sethi (Contact Author)

University of Texas at Dallas - Naveen Jindal School of Management ( email )

800 W. Campbell Road, SM30
Richardson, TX 75080-3021
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
189
Abstract Views
1,213
Rank
291,687
PlumX Metrics