Agency Theory and Work Incentives
Studi Economici, 91(1): 117-146
30 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2012 Last revised: 1 Jul 2016
Date Written: 2007
Abstract
This paper is an extensive review of agency theory applied to labour incentives. It introduces a generalised principal-agent model that goes through a certain degree of critical assessment. The analysis of the optimality within the trade-off of insurance against incentives is enriched by bringing in the contribution of established extensions and new approaches to the agency theory and, to a larger extent, labour incentives.
Keywords: Agency Theory, Incentives, Labour Contracts
JEL Classification: D86, J33, M52
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Lisciandra, Maurizio, Agency Theory and Work Incentives (2007). Studi Economici, 91(1): 117-146, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2152945
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