Agency Theory and Work Incentives

Studi Economici, 91(1): 117-146

30 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2012 Last revised: 1 Jul 2016

Date Written: 2007

Abstract

This paper is an extensive review of agency theory applied to labour incentives. It introduces a generalised principal-agent model that goes through a certain degree of critical assessment. The analysis of the optimality within the trade-off of insurance against incentives is enriched by bringing in the contribution of established extensions and new approaches to the agency theory and, to a larger extent, labour incentives.

Keywords: Agency Theory, Incentives, Labour Contracts

JEL Classification: D86, J33, M52

Suggested Citation

Lisciandra, Maurizio, Agency Theory and Work Incentives (2007). Studi Economici, 91(1): 117-146, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2152945

Maurizio Lisciandra (Contact Author)

LUMSA University

Department of Law, Economics, and Communication
Via Filippo Parlatore 65
Palermo, 90145
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.lumsa.it/en

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