Investment Treaty Breach as Internationally Proscribed Conduct: Shifting Scope, Evolving Objectives, Recalibrated Remedies?

4(2) TRADE L. & DEV. 315 (2012)

40 Pages Posted: 4 Nov 2012 Last revised: 3 Apr 2013

Date Written: November 2, 2012

Abstract

This paper argues that the primacy of monetary relief for investment treaty breaches must be reconsidered in light of the historic shift in the protective scope and objectives of international investment agreements. Over the past few decades international rules on the protection of foreign investment have undergone considerable change, with the notion of property replaced by a broader rubric of investment, and the protection against expropriation supplemented by the arsenal of non-expropriatory standards of treatment, including the guarantees of fair and equitable treatment, non-discrimination, and sanctity of contract. Not only are core investment protection standards liable to a broad interpretation, thus bringing a variety of host state conduct within the purview of investment treaties, but they are also mutually intersubstitutable to the extent that investors are enabled to retroactively redefine the material and jurisdictional scope of the relevant treaty instruments. The notion of internationally proscribed conduct has evolved dramatically and is no longer limited to outrageous and egregious incidences of state interference with foreign investment. The resulting widening in the scope of state responsibility before investors necessitates revisiting the validity of traditional justifications for monetary remedies.

Suggested Citation

Sattorova, Mavluda, Investment Treaty Breach as Internationally Proscribed Conduct: Shifting Scope, Evolving Objectives, Recalibrated Remedies? (November 2, 2012). 4(2) TRADE L. & DEV. 315 (2012), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2170531

Mavluda Sattorova (Contact Author)

University of Liverpool ( email )

Chatham Street
Brownlow Hill
Liverpool, L69 7ZA
United Kingdom

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