The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? - Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets

World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 50-82, October 1993

34 Pages Posted: 11 Nov 2012 Last revised: 22 Nov 2012

See all articles by Louis W. Pauly

Louis W. Pauly

University of Toronto

John Goodman

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: October 1, 1993

Abstract

Between the late 1970s and the early 1990s, after decades of trying to limit short-term international capital movements, advanced industrial states moved decisively in the direction of decontrol. What has driven this remarkable policy convergence? The answer lies not in ideological change or shifts in relative political power, but in the prior development of international financial markets and in the increasing globalization of business. In a policy environment fundamentally reshaped by these factors, financial institutions and multinational firms were able to threaten or implement strategies of evasion and exit. Thus, the usefulness of controls declined as their effective costs rose sharply. In this light, the cases of Japan, Germany, Italy, and France are examined. The analysis points to the tightening link between short-term capital movements and foreign direct investment, issues that have long been treated as conceptually distinct. It also underlines the intricate connection between national policies governing capital movements and those aimed at managing international financial markets.

Keywords: capital controls, globalization, international financial markets

JEL Classification: F30

Suggested Citation

Pauly, Louis W. and Goodman, John, The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? - Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets (October 1, 1993). World Politics, Vol. 46, No. 1, pp. 50-82, October 1993, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2173476

Louis W. Pauly (Contact Author)

University of Toronto ( email )

Sidney Smith Hall
100 St George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G3
Canada

John Goodman

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

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