Dodd-Frank's Whistleblower Provision Fails to Go Far Enough: Making the Case for a Qui Tam Provision in a Revised Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

31 Pages Posted: 16 Nov 2012 Last revised: 25 Jun 2013

See all articles by B. Nathaniel Garrett

B. Nathaniel Garrett

University of Cincinnati - College of Law

Date Written: December 3, 2011

Abstract

In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, Congress enacted the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank). Included within Dodd–Frank is a whistleblower provision that some businesses believe has gone too far. While Dodd–Frank's reach is substantial, the whistleblower provision actually fails to go far enough as applied to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

In this article, I argue that there are several statutory roadblocks and administrative hindrances that will prevent Dodd-Frank's whistleblower provision from assisting in the enforcement of the FCPA. I then argue that the solution is for Congress to amend the FCPA to include a qui tam provision, modeled after the qui tam provision found in the False Claims Act. For reasons that I discuss, a qui tam provision not only makes sense in the FCPA, but will led to a better enforcement environment.

The article contributes a novel idea to FCPA reform scholarship and highlights several problems that practitioners must be aware of when submitting FCPA tips under Dodd-Frank.

Keywords: Dodd-Frank, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Qui tam, False Claims Act, whistleblower, FCA, FCPA

JEL Classification: Law, Legal

Suggested Citation

Garrett, B. Nathaniel, Dodd-Frank's Whistleblower Provision Fails to Go Far Enough: Making the Case for a Qui Tam Provision in a Revised Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (December 3, 2011). University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, No. 2, 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2175828

B. Nathaniel Garrett (Contact Author)

University of Cincinnati - College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 210040
Cincinnati, OH 45221-0040
United States

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