Privacy, Time Consistent Optimal Labor Income Taxation and Education Policy

20 Pages Posted: 22 May 2000

See all articles by Kai A. Konrad

Kai A. Konrad

Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: December 1999

Abstract

Incomplete information is a commitment device for time consistency problems. In the context of time consistent labor income taxation privacy can lead to a Pareto superior outcome and increases the effectiveness of public education as a second best policy.

JEL Classification: H21, H23

Suggested Citation

Konrad, Kai A., Privacy, Time Consistent Optimal Labor Income Taxation and Education Policy (December 1999). IZA Discussion Paper No. 82, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=217771 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.217771

Kai A. Konrad (Contact Author)

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