Italian Reform of the Academic Recruitment System: An Appraisal of Anvur and Cun Benchmarks for Assessing Candidates and Commissioners

Posted: 30 Nov 2012

See all articles by Antonio Abatemarco

Antonio Abatemarco

affiliation not provided to SSRN

Roberto Dell'Anno

CSEF - University of Naples Federico II; Institute for Corruption Studies

Date Written: December 2012

Abstract

The present study is aimed at contributing to the ongoing debate about the implications of the incoming recruitment system as proposed by Law 240/2010 (Gelmini's reform). For this purpose, the main implications of the two alternative criteria respectively proposed by the National Agency for the Evaluation of the University System and Research (ANVUR) and the National University Council (Consiglio Universitario Nazionale - CUN) are investigated for assessing candidates and commissioners admitted to apply for the national scientific approval of the Italian academic recruitment system. Using the sample of 1327 Italian academic economists (secs p/01, p/02, p/03) enrolled for the academic year 2011-12, the analysis provides two simulations. First, the thresholds for both ANVUR and CUN criteria as well as the resulting shares of 'qualified' candidates and commissioners are computed. Second, the impact of the new eligibility criteria on the academic competitions (p01, p02, p03) that occurred in 2005 is simulated under the assumption that behavioral responses are absent. The findings suggest that CUN criteria provide more selective benchmarks than ANVUR ones, and in the absence of behavioral responses, the new system of recruitment is expected to remarkably affect the profile of the Italian academic system.

Keywords: academic recruitment system, Italian University Reform, citation-based indices, research assessment

JEL Classification: H52, I28

Suggested Citation

Abatemarco, Antonio and Dell'Anno, Roberto, Italian Reform of the Academic Recruitment System: An Appraisal of Anvur and Cun Benchmarks for Assessing Candidates and Commissioners (December 2012). Rivista Italiana degli Economisti, Vol. 3, December 2012, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2182492

Antonio Abatemarco (Contact Author)

affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )

Roberto Dell'Anno

CSEF - University of Naples Federico II ( email )

Via John Paul II 132
Fisciano (SA), 84084
Italy
+45 8942 1133 (Phone)
+45 8613 6334 (Fax)

Institute for Corruption Studies

Stevenson Hall 425
Normal, IL 61790-4200
United States

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