The Fragility of Deterrence in Conflicts
16 Pages Posted: 6 Dec 2012
Date Written: December 5, 2012
Abstract
We study deterrence in sequential move conflicts, modeled as a contest. We bias the model in favor of peace by assuming that under complete information deterrence is achieved and peace prevails. We show that under incomplete information about states' types (resolve) the chances of deterrence decrease rapidly. Studying a uniform type distribution, we show that the finer the type space becomes the more resolve a defending state must have to support deterrence in equilibrium. In the limit, as types occur on a continuum, deterrence is possible only under relatively extreme conditions.
Keywords: contests, conflict, possibility of deterrence, incomplete information
JEL Classification: D01, D74, P48
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
Self-Enforcing Political System and Economic Growth: Late Medieval Genoa
By Avner Greif
-
Explaining Conflict in Low-Income Countries: Incomplete Contracting in the Shadow of the Future
-
Investing in Terra Incognita: Waiting and Learning
By Christian Thimann and Marcel P. Thum
-
What Determines the Rate of Growth and Technological Change?
By Yuko Kinoshita and Ashoka Mody
-
By Helmut Bester and Kai A. Konrad
-
Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict
By Helmut Bester and Kai A. Konrad
-
Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict
By Helmut Bester and Kai A. Konrad