Optimal Monetary and Prudential Policies

40 Pages Posted: 22 Dec 2012

See all articles by Fabrice Collard

Fabrice Collard

University of Berne - Department of Economics

Harris Dellas

University of Bern - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Behzad Diba

Georgetown University

Olivier Loisel

CREST-ENSAE

Date Written: December 21, 2012

Abstract

The recent financial crisis has highlighted the interconnectedness between macroeconomic and financial stability and has raised the question of whether and how to combine the corresponding main policy instruments (interest rate and bank-capital requirements). This paper offers a characterization of the jointly optimal setting of monetary and prudential policies and discusses its implications for the business cycle. The source of financial fragility is the socially excessive risk-taking by banks due to limited liability and deposit insurance. We characterize the conditions under which locally optimal (Ramsey) policy dedicates the prudential instrument to preventing inefficient risk-taking by banks; and the monetary instrument to dealing with the business cycle, with the two instruments co-varying negatively. Our analysis thus identifies circumstances that can validate the prevailing view among central bankers that standard interest-rate policy cannot serve as the first line of defense against financial instability. In addition, we also provide conditions under which the two instruments might optimally co-move positively and countercyclically

Keywords: prudential policy, capital requirements, monetary policy, Ramsey-optimal policies

JEL Classification: E32, E44, E52

Suggested Citation

Collard, Fabrice and Dellas, Harris and Diba, Bezhad and Loisel, Olivier, Optimal Monetary and Prudential Policies (December 21, 2012). Banque de France Working Paper No. 413, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2192467 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2192467

Fabrice Collard

University of Berne - Department of Economics ( email )

Schanzeneckstrasse 1
Bern, CH-3001
Switzerland

HOME PAGE: http://fabcol.free.fr

Harris Dellas

University of Bern - Department of Economics ( email )

Gesellschaftstrasse 49
Bern, CH-3012
Switzerland
+41 31 631 3989 (Phone)
+41 31 631 3992 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Bezhad Diba

Georgetown University ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States
2026875682 (Phone)
2026876102 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econ.georgetown.edu/

Olivier Loisel (Contact Author)

CREST-ENSAE ( email )

5 avenue Henry Le Chatelier
Palaiseau, 91120
France