Selection, Heterogeneity and Entry in Professional Markets
41 Pages Posted: 28 Dec 2012
Date Written: December 28, 2012
Abstract
We analyze two different cases of entry regulation in professional markets: first, when licensing is a requirement for becoming a professional (lawyers); second, when entry and price restrictions are applied on a geographical basis (pharmacists). Both cases are investigated within a circular model of localized competition and heterogeneous players. The analysis reveals that licensing introduces a selection mechanism which is effective in preventing entry of inefficient players in markets with large ex-ante heterogeneity. Furthermore, because in the second case excessive entry is reduced as the degree of heterogeneity increases, our analysis lends support to a policy that simultaneously relaxes entry and price restrictions.
Keywords: Liberal professions, Cost/quality heterogeneity, Entry regulation, Localized competition
JEL Classification: L11, D61
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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