The EU Fiscal Compact: Constitutionalization of Austerity and Preemption of Democracy in Europe

29 Pages Posted: 29 Dec 2012 Last revised: 9 Jul 2013

See all articles by Matjaz Nahtigal

Matjaz Nahtigal

Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana

Bojan Bugaric

University of Sheffield, Department of Law; affiliation not provided to SSRN

Date Written: September 1, 2012

Abstract

In the article on the EU Fiscal Compact we are trying to show that the Fiscal Compact as adopted in its current form does not necessarily lead to the improved quality of fiscal policy in the Eurozone. At the same time it disproportionally interfers with the autonomous fiscal policies of the member states and with their constitutional arrangements.

In combination with the indiscriminatory implementation of austerity policy across EU the Fiscal Compact may further supress socio-economic developments in many of the EU countries and their regions. We are of the opinion that the Fiscal Compact in its current form – if adopted and strictly implemented as envisaged – may further deteriorate the socio-economic situation in many parts of the EU.

Alternatively, we propose more decentralized approach toward fiscal consolidation in the EU member states and their regions. Such an approach would be more tailored to the different needs and different situations and would allow more proactive development approach for many local communities, regions and member states in the EU. Therefore, more bottom-up instead of top-down approach to fiscal consolidation and to more inclusive, more balanced and more diverse development may be viewed as an alternative approach to the EU integration process.

Keywords: European Economic Law, Comparative and Foreign Law, Constitutional Law, International Law

JEL Classification: F15, H12, H62, K19

Suggested Citation

Nahtigal, Matjaz and Bugaric, Bojan, The EU Fiscal Compact: Constitutionalization of Austerity and Preemption of Democracy in Europe (September 1, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2194475 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2194475

Matjaz Nahtigal (Contact Author)

Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana ( email )

Kardeljeva ploscad 5
Ljubljana, 1000

Bojan Bugaric

University of Sheffield, Department of Law ( email )

Bartolome House, Winter Street
Sheffield, South Yorkshire S37ND
United Kingdom
07988728348 (Phone)
S17 3 QL (Fax)

affiliation not provided to SSRN

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