Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992 Sec Proxy Reforms
64 Pages Posted: 8 May 2000
Date Written: 2000
Abstract
This article assesses the impact of the 1992 SEC reforms that enhanced the ability of share-holders to communicate during a proxy contest. Utilizing a sample of 361 shareholder-sponsored corporate governance issue proposals from 1991 to 1995, the article finds that the mean percentage of total outstanding votes cast in favor of an issue proposal declined sig-nificantly post-reform. As explanation, the article furnishes evidence that certain sponsors interested in their own private agenda rather than general shareholder welfare exploited more fully the proxy mechanism post-reform; controlling for the composition of sponsors, the proxy reforms generated no significant change in the for-vote outcome of issue proposals. The article concludes instead that the reforms resulted in a shift in the composition of issue proposals targets toward companies relatively less vulnerable to such proposals pre-reform.
JEL Classification: G34, G38
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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