Effectiveness of Capital Controls: Evidence from Thailand

46 Pages Posted: 21 Jan 2013

See all articles by Juthathip Jongwanich

Juthathip Jongwanich

Australian National University (ANU) - Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies (RSPAS)

Archanun Kohpaiboon

Thammasat University

Date Written: December 1, 2012

Abstract

This paper examines the effectiveness of capital account policies in Thailand during the period 1993–2010. Our results show that policies toward capital account liberalization tend to be more effective than those toward capital account restriction in changing the volume of capital flows. The composition of capital flows also matters for the effectiveness of policy measures. When capital restrictions were introduced in the late 2000s, our results show that there was a switching effect from more capital restricted asset classes toward less restricted ones. This study also finds that the central bank did not gain more monetary autonomy from introducing capital inflow restrictions. However, such restrictions, both inflows and outflows (liability side), could help limit the fluctuations in the nominal exchange rate, especially relative to the US dollar in 2000–2010.

Keywords: capital flows, capital controls, financial integration, Asia

JEL Classification: F21, F32, F36, F41, G15

Suggested Citation

Jongwanich, Juthathip and Kohpaiboon, Archanun, Effectiveness of Capital Controls: Evidence from Thailand (December 1, 2012). Asian Development Review, Vol. 29 No. 2, pp. 50-93, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2204250

Juthathip Jongwanich (Contact Author)

Australian National University (ANU) - Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies (RSPAS) ( email )

Division of Economics, RSPAS
Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200
Australia

Archanun Kohpaiboon

Thammasat University ( email )

Faculty of Political Science, Prachan Road
Bangkok, 10200
Thailand

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