The Marginality of Citizens United

15 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2013

Date Written: 2011

Abstract

As this symposium and countless opinion pieces denouncing or (less frequently) praising Citizens United v. FEC illustrate, that ruling is already regarded as extremely important. Yet, as I shall argue in this Response, it is likely to have no more than a marginal practical effect. Partly, that is for reasons identified by Professors Wert, Gaddie, and Bullock (hereinafter "WGB") in their symposium contribution. As they explain, corporate fears of alienating customers by becoming too closely associated with a political party or controversial political positions temper the corporate appetite for direct spending on politics-at least insofar as such spending is visible to the public.

But there is also a more fundamental reason why Citizens United will not substantially change the shape of American politics: Even before Citizens United, corporations or, more precisely, persons and entities with substantial accumulated wealth, already had, and frequently took advantage of, the opportunity to exert enormous influence over American politics, both directly and indirectly.

Before coming to that point, however, it will be useful to situate Citizens United. Fortunately, the three principal papers in this symposium provide an excellent framework for considering how Citizens United changed and, more importantly, did not change, the ability of monied interests to influence politics.

Keywords: direct spending on politics, Citizens United, campaign, spending, finance

Suggested Citation

Dorf, Michael C., The Marginality of Citizens United (2011). Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 20, No. 739, 2011, Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-45, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2215856

Michael C. Dorf (Contact Author)

Cornell Law School ( email )

Myron Taylor Hall
Cornell University
Ithaca, NY 14853-4901
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/faculty/bio.cfm?id=333

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