Download This PaperIntention-Based Fairness Preferences in Two-Player Contests
8 Pages Posted: 19 Feb 2013
Date Written: February 18, 2013
Abstract
We analyze equilibria of two-player contests where players have intention-based preferences. We find that players invest more effort compared to the case with selfish preferences and are even willing to exert effort when the monetary value of the prize converges to zero. As a consequence, overdissipation occurs if the value of the prize is sufficiently small.
Keywords: contests, intention-based fairness preferences
JEL Classification: D030, D720, D740
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Hoffmann, Magnus and Kolmar, Martin, Intention-Based Fairness Preferences in Two-Player Contests (February 18, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4104, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2220125 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2220125
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