Political Parties and the Politics of Regions: Constitutional Structure and Party Policy Positions

Abstract

The extent to which electoral rules encourage voters to focus on individual candidates versus broad party labels influences how politicians and their parties allocate resources. We argue that the constitutional structures that define territorial organization also should be reflected in party platforms in predictable ways. Territorial organization that makes controlling subnational government and policy making attractive should encourage parties to tailor their platforms to appeal to relatively narrow, regionally based electorates, while parties in more unitary states should seek to appeal to a broader, cross-constituency electorate. In effect, the value of doing well in any given region increases with the value of controlling regional government, approximating even in highly proportional systems the incentives for candidates to differentiate themselves locally under candidate-centered SMD electoral rules. This effect should be most pronounced where subnational parties compete for office (as in Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain, or Scotland in the UK), thus forcing their national counterparts to adapt in order to remain locally competitive. We develop this argument and examine its implications using new data on party positions in Spain and the UK.