Measuring Institutions: Independence, Authority, and Accountability, with an Application to Legislative Process

49 Pages Posted: 17 Jun 2013

See all articles by Diane Branduse

Diane Branduse

State University of New York (SUNY) - Department of Political Science

William Heller

State University of New York (SUNY) - Department of Political Science

Date Written: 2012

Abstract

Veto player theory has profoundly influenced political science, contributing both to theoretical clarity and to a minor revolution in defining and measuring political systems. The simplicity that makes the approach conceptually powerful is problematic for modeling and empirical analysis, however. For instance, it might not be appropriate to expect institutional or partisan veto players to face the same incentives about whether or when to wield their veto authority; moreover, some institutionally defined players often possess important powers distinct from legislative structure and process to punish (or reward) veto players. The effect, we argue, is to situate the decision whether to exercise a veto in a framework similar to principal-agent models. Veto players' payoffs thus extend beyond the policy at hand, depending on where they are in the broader institutional structure. Consequently, we believe that most empirical studies of veto points or checks are built on misleading measures that are too limited for the goals they set. We thus propose a novel approach to operationalizing the concept of checks, building on the idea that vetoes should be considered in their institutional context, where other constitutional features can strengthen or undermine a veto player'€™s willingness to act. We use IAEP data (Regan, Frank and Clark 2009) to generate a cross-national time-series index of institutional checks, which we then use to replicate several prominent studies in order to highlight issues of validity and reliability and to illustrate the importance of taking seriously institutional authorities beyond those that affect '€œhow a bill becomes a law.'€ We also stress that our measure is purely institutional, distinguishing partisan and other preference-based concerns from institutional authority, but discuss ways to incorporate 'player preferences €”in recognition that outcomes result from the combination of institutions and preferences'€” using existing data.

Suggested Citation

Branduse, Diane and Heller, William B., Measuring Institutions: Independence, Authority, and Accountability, with an Application to Legislative Process (2012). EPSA 2013 Annual General Conference Paper 282, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2224762

Diane Branduse

State University of New York (SUNY) - Department of Political Science ( email )

Binghamton, NY 13902-6000
United States

William B. Heller (Contact Author)

State University of New York (SUNY) - Department of Political Science ( email )

Binghamton, NY 13902-6000
United States

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