The Most Unkindest Cuts: Government Cohesion and Economic Crisis

25 Pages Posted: 2 May 2013 Last revised: 20 Jul 2013

See all articles by Alexander Herzog

Alexander Herzog

Clemson University, Social Analytics Institute & Big Data Systems and Analytics Lab

Kenneth Benoit

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE); Trinity College Dublin

Date Written: June 18, 2013

Abstract

Economic crisis and the resulting need for austerity budgets has divided many governing parties in Europe, despite the strict party discipline exercised over the legislative votes to approve these harsh budgets. Our analysis attempts to measure divisions in governing coalitions by applying automated text analysis methods to scale the positions that MPs express in budget debates. Our test case is Ireland, a country that has experienced both periods of rapid economic growth as well as one deep financial and economic crisis. Our analysis includes all annual budget debates during the time period from 1983 to 2013. We demonstrate that government cohesion as expressed through legislative speeches has significantly decreased as the economic crisis deepened, the result of government backbenchers expressing speaking against the painful austerity budgets introduced by their own governments. While ministers are bounded by the doctrine of collective cabinet responsibility and hence always vote for the finance ministers’ budget proposal, we find that party backbenchers’ position-taking is systematically related to the economic vulnerability of their constituencies and to the safety of their electoral margins.

Keywords: Financial crisis, budgetary debates, party discipline, intra-party conflict, text analysis

Suggested Citation

Herzog, Alexander and Benoit, Kenneth, The Most Unkindest Cuts: Government Cohesion and Economic Crisis (June 18, 2013). EPSA 2013 Annual General Conference Paper 705, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2225069

Alexander Herzog

Clemson University, Social Analytics Institute & Big Data Systems and Analytics Lab ( email )

100 Sirrine Hall
Clemson, SC 29634
United States

Kenneth Benoit (Contact Author)

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Trinity College Dublin ( email )

3 College Green
Trinity College
Dublin, 2
Ireland

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