Self-Enforcing Environmental Agreements and International Trade

34 Pages Posted: 27 Feb 2013

See all articles by Thomas Eichner

Thomas Eichner

FernUniversität in Hagen

Rudiger Pethig

University of Siegen - School of Economic Disciplines; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Date Written: February 27, 2013

Abstract

In the basic model of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994; Rubio and Ulph 2006) the number of signatories of self-enforcing IEAs does not exceed three, if non-positive emissions are ruled out. We extend that model by introducing a composite consumer good and fossil fuel that are produced and consumed in each country and traded on world markets. When signatory countries act as Stackelberg leader and emissions are positive, the size of stable IEAs may be significantly larger in our model with international trade. This would be good news if larger self-enforcing IEAs would lead to stronger reductions of total emissions. Unfortunately, in the presence of self-enforcing IEAs total emissions turn out to be only slightly less than in the business as usual scenario, independent of the number of signatories. We also investigate the role of international trade by comparing our free-trade results with the outcome in the regime of autarky. Our autarky model turns out to coincide with the basic model of the literature alluded to above. We contribute to that literature by showing that in autarky the outcome of self-enforcing IEAs is also almost the same as in business as usual.

Keywords: international trade, self-enforcing environmental agreements, Stackelberg equilibrium

JEL Classification: C720, F020, Q500, Q580

Suggested Citation

Eichner, Thomas and Pethig, Rudiger, Self-Enforcing Environmental Agreements and International Trade (February 27, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4125, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2225632 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2225632

Thomas Eichner

FernUniversität in Hagen ( email )

Universitätsstrasse 41
Feithstrathe 140
Hagen, 58084
Germany

Rudiger Pethig (Contact Author)

University of Siegen - School of Economic Disciplines ( email )

Hoelderlinstrasse 3
57068 Siegen
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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