Partially Binding Platforms: Campaign Promises Vis-a-Vis Cost of Betrayal
45 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2013 Last revised: 7 Oct 2014
Date Written: August 25, 2014
Abstract
This paper examines the effects of campaign platforms in a political competition when campaign platforms are partially binding such that a candidate who implements a policy different from his/her platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also analyze endogenous decisions by citizens to run for election. First, partially binding platforms can show an asymmetric electoral outcome and predict who wins. A candidate who is more moderate and less policy motivated, and whose cost of betrayal is higher than that of the opponent with the same degree of betrayal wins. Second, even though a candidate knows that he/she will lose, he/she enters the race to induce the opponent to approach the loser's ideal policy.
Keywords: political competition, endogenous candidates, campaign platforms, valence
JEL Classification: C72, D72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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