Migration Elasticities, Fiscal Federalism and the Ability of States to Redistribute Income
Posted: 5 Mar 2013
There are 2 versions of this paper
Migration Elasticities, Fiscal Federalism and the Ability of States to Redistribute Income
Date Written: 2012
Abstract
This paper develops a simulation model in order to examine the effectiveness of state attempts at redistribution under a variety of migration elasticity assumptions. Key outputs from the simulation include the impact of tax-induced migration on state revenues, excess burden, and fiscal externalities. With modest migration elasticities, the costs of state-level redistribution are substantial, but state action may still be preferred to a federal policy that is at odds with preferences of a state’s citizens. At higher migration elasticities, the costs of state action can be tremendous. Overall excess burden is greater, but this is dominated by horizontal fiscal externalities. Horizontal fiscal externalities represent a cost to the state pursuing additional redistribution, but not a cost at the national level.
Keywords: fiscal federalism, income redistribution, excess burden, deadweight loss, fiscal externalities
JEL Classification: H21, H23, H71
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation