Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration: A Contingency Framework

Academy of Management Perspectives, Vol. 24, No. 1, February 2010, 10.5465/AMP.2010.50304414

Posted: 21 Mar 2013

See all articles by Deborah Allcock

Deborah Allcock

University of Huddersfield

Igor Filatotchev

City University London - The Business School

Date Written: March 15, 2013

Abstract

By integrating organizational and institutional theories, this paper develops a contingency approach to executive remuneration and assesses its effectiveness in different organizational and institutional contexts. Most of the executive remuneration research focuses on the principal-agent framework and assumes a universal link between executive incentives and performance outcomes. We suggest a framework that examines executive compensation in terms of its organizational contexts and potential complementarities/ substitution effects between different corporate governance practices at both the firm and national levels. We also discuss the implications for different approaches to executive compensation policy such as "soft law" and "hard law."

Keywords: executive compensation, corporate governance, performance awards, organizational structure, agency theory, stockholders

Suggested Citation

Allcock, Deborah and Filatotchev, Igor, Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration: A Contingency Framework (March 15, 2013). Academy of Management Perspectives, Vol. 24, No. 1, February 2010, 10.5465/AMP.2010.50304414, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2233966

Deborah Allcock (Contact Author)

University of Huddersfield ( email )

Queensgate
Huddersfield HD1 3DH, West Yorkshire HD1 3DH
United Kingdom

Igor Filatotchev

City University London - The Business School ( email )

106 Bunhill Row
London, EC1Y 8TZ
United Kingdom

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