Free to Punish? The American Dream and the Harsh Treatment of Criminals

53 Pages Posted: 20 Mar 2013

See all articles by Rafael Di Tella

Rafael Di Tella

Harvard Business School - Business, Government and the International Economy Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Juan Dubra

University of Montevideo - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 18, 2011

Abstract

We describe the evolution of selective aspects of punishment in the United States over the period 1980–2004. We note that imprisonment increased around 1980, a period that coincides with the ‘‘Reagan revolution’’ in economic matters. We build an economic model where beliefs about economic opportunities and beliefs about punishment are correlated. We present three pieces of evidence (across countries, within the United States, and an experimental exercise) that are consistent with the model.

Keywords: prison-industrial complex, U.S. Incarceration Rate, death penalty in the United States, American criminal justice system, plea bargain, race and prison population

JEL Classification: K10, K14

Suggested Citation

Di Tella, Rafael and Dubra, Juan, Free to Punish? The American Dream and the Harsh Treatment of Criminals (March 18, 2011). Cato Papers on Public Policy Vol. 1, 2011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2235069

Rafael Di Tella (Contact Author)

Harvard Business School - Business, Government and the International Economy Unit ( email )

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617-496-5985 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.people.hbs.edu/rditella/

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Juan Dubra

University of Montevideo - Department of Economics ( email )

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Uruguay
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HOME PAGE: http:\\www2.um.edu.uy\dubraj

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