Modeling Financial Incentives to Get Unemployed Back to Work
54 Pages Posted: 6 Nov 2000
Date Written: January 2000
Abstract
We model how unemployment benefit sanctions - benefit reductions that are imposed if unemployed do not comply with job search guidelines - affect unemployment. In our analysis we find that not only micro effects concerning the behavior of individual unemployed workers are relevant, but also macro-spillover effects from the additional creation of vacancies, which originates from the increased effectiveness of labor supply. We advocate that for a given loss in welfare for the unemployed benefit sanctions are more effective in reducing unemployment than an across the board reduction in the replacement rate.
JEL Classification: H55, J65, J68
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?
Recommended Papers
-
By Jaap H. Abbring, Gerard J. Van Den Berg, ...
-
Do Unemployment Insurance Recipients Actively Seek Work? Randomized Trials in Four U.S. States
By Orley Ashenfelter, David Ashmore, ...
-
The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment
By Rafael Lalive, Jan C. Van Ours, ...
-
The Effect of Benefit Sanctions on the Duration of Unemployment
By Rafael Lalive, Jan C. Van Ours, ...
-
By Dan Black, Jeffrey A. Smith, ...
-
Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research
By Peter Fredriksson and Bertil Holmlund
-
Education and Unemployment of Women
By Jacob Mincer