The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933
57 Pages Posted: 11 May 2000
There are 2 versions of this paper
The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933
The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933
Date Written: May 24, 2000
Abstract
The Securities Act of 1933 is typically described as a "full disclosure" statute, yet many of its detailed provisions forbid disclosure about pending offerings during specified periods or using specified media. These features provided governmental enforcement of retail selling restrictions that were widely used by managing underwriters but that became difficult to enforce contractually during the late 1920s. The net effect was to protect separate wholesale and retail investment banks from competition by integrated firms. A likely reason is that Congress relied principally on wholesale investment banks for information about "unsound" investment banking practices.
JEL Classification: K22, G24
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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