Competition, Takeovers, and Gender Discrimination

Posted: 27 Apr 2013

See all articles by Fredrik Heyman

Fredrik Heyman

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

Helena Svaleryd

Uppsala University

Jonas Vlachos

Stockholm University - Department of Economics; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)

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Date Written: April 1, 2013

Abstract

Theories of taste-based discrimination predict that competitive pressures will drive discriminatory behavior out of the market. The authors analyze how firm takeovers and product market competition affect firms’ gender composition and gender wage gap using detailed matched employer-employee data. Taking into account several endogeneity concerns while using a difference-in-difference framework, they find that the share of female employees increases as a result of an ownership change when product market competition is weak. Furthermore, a takeover reduces the gender wage gap. Although the estimated effects are small, the results support the main theoretical predictions.

Keywords: discrimination, competition, takeovers, wages

JEL Classification: J71, J30

Suggested Citation

Heyman, Fredrik and Svaleryd, Helena and Vlachos, Jonas, Competition, Takeovers, and Gender Discrimination (April 1, 2013). Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 66, No. 2, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2256636

Fredrik Heyman (Contact Author)

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.ifn.se/eng/people/research-faculty/fredrikh_1

Helena Svaleryd

Uppsala University ( email )

P.O. Box 513
Uppsala, 75120
Sweden

Jonas Vlachos

Stockholm University - Department of Economics ( email )

Stockholm, 10691
Sweden

Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN) ( email )

Box 55665
Grevgatan 34, 2nd floor
Stockholm, SE-102 15
Sweden

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