Board of Director's Attributes and Earning Management: Evidence from Egypt

Proceedings of 6th International Business and Social Sciences Research Conference, January 2013

20 Pages Posted: 28 Apr 2013

See all articles by Mohammed Soliman

Mohammed Soliman

Arab Academy for Science, Technology & Maritime Transport

Aiman A. Ragab

Arab Academy for Science - Technology & Maritime Transport

Date Written: April 27, 2013

Abstract

Board of directors play a vital role in controlling agency problem between shareholders and managers arise due to earnings management. This paper examines the roles of independent members on the board, chief executive officer who also serves as a chairman of the company (hereinafter called CEO duality), board size on earnings management practices. After controlling for size, leverage and growth, we found discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management is positively related to the existence of CEO duality, and negatively related to board size. Also, examination of the data shows that the ratio of independent board members is not significantly related to earnings management. The findings of this paper will be of interest to investors in the Egyptian stock market. This paper also provides many recommendations to the regulatory authorities in Egypt regarding ways to strengthen and reinforce the Board of Director’s Attributes of companies.

Suggested Citation

Soliman, Mohammed Moustafa and Ragab, Aiman A., Board of Director's Attributes and Earning Management: Evidence from Egypt (April 27, 2013). Proceedings of 6th International Business and Social Sciences Research Conference, January 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2257224

Mohammed Moustafa Soliman (Contact Author)

Arab Academy for Science, Technology & Maritime Transport ( email )

P.O. Box 1029
Alexandria, 1029
Egypt

Aiman A. Ragab

Arab Academy for Science - Technology & Maritime Transport ( email )

P.O. Box 1029
Miami, Alexandria, 1029
Egypt

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