Misconceptions and Political Outcomes

34 Pages Posted: 24 Jul 2000 Last revised: 19 Sep 2022

See all articles by David H. Romer

David H. Romer

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: July 1997

Abstract

A large recent literature shows that strategic interactions among actors with conflicting objectives can produce inefficient political decisions. This paper investigates an alternative explanation of such decisions: if individuals' errors in assessing the likely effects of proposed policies are correlated, democratic decision-making can produce inefficient outcomes even in the absence of distributional conflicts or heterogeneous preferences. Choosing candidates from among the best informed members of the population does not remedy the problems created by such errors, but subsidizing information and exposing representatives to information after their election do. Concentration of power has ambiguous effects. Finally, the presence of correlated errors tends to create multiple equilibria in political institutions.

Suggested Citation

Romer, David H., Misconceptions and Political Outcomes (July 1997). NBER Working Paper No. w6117, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=225885

David H. Romer (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )

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