Public Good Coalitions and Membership Exclusion

7 Pages Posted: 7 May 2013

Date Written: December 25, 2012

Abstract

Many local public goods are provided in coalitions. When coalitions form they may have the power to exclude members. The core applies to such cases. When coalitions cannot exclude members, all who prefer the provided public good can join. The no-exodus equilibrium is proposed for such cases. It is an extension of the Tiebout equilibrium in the long run when the number of coalitions can vary and membership exclusion is not granted.

Keywords: public goods, coalition

JEL Classification: C71, D71, H41

Suggested Citation

Kung, Fan-chin, Public Good Coalitions and Membership Exclusion (December 25, 2012). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2261505 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2261505

Fan-chin Kung (Contact Author)

East Carolina University ( email )

Brewster A438
Greenville, NC 27858
United States

HOME PAGE: http://myweb.ecu.edu/kungf/

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