Negative Campaigning in a Probabilistic Voting Model

34 Pages Posted: 16 May 2013

See all articles by Jan K. Brueckner

Jan K. Brueckner

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Kangoh Lee

San Diego State University - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 15, 2013

Abstract

This paper extends the small existing theoretical literature on negative campaigning, building on work by Harrington and Hess (1996). While their analysis explores the determinants of negative campaign spending using a classic spatial voting model, this paper relies instead on a probabilistic voting model, extending the use of this popular model to a new setting. By using two different versions of the model based on different assumptions on the targeting of campaign spending, the paper generates a host of results. However, the main lesson, which emerges in fairly robust fashion regardless of specific assumptions, is that negative campaign spending is higher for the relatively centrist candidate. The more-extreme candidate in the electoral contest devotes, by contrast, comparatively more of her funds to positive campaign spending. This result, which at first appears unrelated to the main findings of Harrington and Hess (1996) and Chakrabarti’s (2007) extension of their model, is actually consistent with their results upon deeper examination.

Keywords: negative campaigning, probabilistic voting

JEL Classification: D700

Suggested Citation

Brueckner, Jan K. and Lee, Kangoh, Negative Campaigning in a Probabilistic Voting Model (May 15, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4233, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2265300 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2265300

Jan K. Brueckner (Contact Author)

University of California, Irvine - Department of Economics ( email )

3151 Social Science Plaza
Irvine, CA 92697-5100
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Kangoh Lee

San Diego State University - Department of Economics ( email )

5500 Campanile Drive
San Diego, CA 92182
United States

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