Combating the Financial Crisis: European and German Corporate and Securities Laws and the Case for Abolishing Sovereign Debtors’ Privileges

56 Pages Posted: 22 May 2013

See all articles by Christian Kersting

Christian Kersting

Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf - Faculty of Law

Date Written: June 2012

Abstract

The financial crisis is a multidimensional phenomenon. It involves private and state actors. It touches on private, public, national, constitutional, European, and international law. It is embedded in political visions of peace, prosperity, and solidarity that to a certain extent collide with hard economic facts and different priorities set by public opinion in different states. The complexity of the issue makes it imperative to focus on specific aspects. The first part of this Article deals primarily with the 2008 Sub-Prime Crisis, the corporate law tools employed in Germany to combat it, and the European context. The second part briefly looks at the ongoing Sovereign Debt Crisis and focuses on securities law and private law measures taken by the European Union. The third part looks more closely at sovereign debtors and suggests that they be treated to a greater extent like private debtors. Other issues like institutional reforms within the European Union and especially within the euro area, i.e., the Member States of the European Union that use the euro as their currency, will only be dealt with colorandi causa.

Keywords: Sovereign Debt Crisis, financial crisis, European Union, sovereign debtors, disclosure, market manipulation, privileges, exemption, exception, Sub-Prime Crisis

JEL Classification: G28, H6, K2

Suggested Citation

Kersting, Christian, Combating the Financial Crisis: European and German Corporate and Securities Laws and the Case for Abolishing Sovereign Debtors’ Privileges (June 2012). Texas International Law Journal, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2013, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2268475

Christian Kersting (Contact Author)

Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf - Faculty of Law ( email )

Universitätsstr. 1
Düsseldorf, D-40225
Germany
0211 8111660 (Phone)

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