Credit Default Swaps in General Equilibrium: Endogenous Default and Credit Spread Spillovers

60 Pages Posted: 30 May 2013 Last revised: 26 Aug 2022

See all articles by Matthew Darst

Matthew Darst

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Ehraz Refayet

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Department of Treasury

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 25, 2018

Abstract

This paper shows that credit default swaps (CDS) can affect the type of debt firms issue. Firms face a trade-off between investment scale and the cost of capital measured by the credit spread. Small-scale investment is safe, fully collateralized, but earns modest profits in all states. Large-scale investment is risky, requires a positive credit spread, but yields high profits only in good states and default in bad states. CDS only affect risky credit spreads, which in turn affects the opportunity cost of issuing collateralized, safe debt. Covered (Naked) CDS lower (raise) credit spreads and raise (lower) the likelihood of issuing risky debt. Lastly, we show that CDS generate credit spread and investment spillovers for non CDS-referenced firms.

Keywords: credit derivatives, borrowing costs, spillovers, investment, default risk

JEL Classification: D52, D53, E44, G10, G12

Suggested Citation

Darst, Matthew and Refayet, Ehraz, Credit Default Swaps in General Equilibrium: Endogenous Default and Credit Spread Spillovers (January 25, 2018). Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2271685 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2271685

Matthew Darst (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Ehraz Refayet

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Department of Treasury ( email )

400 7th Street SW
Washington, DC 20219
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/economics/economics-staff/bios/ehraz-refayet-bio.html

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