Financial Liberalization, Market Structure and Credit Penetration

48 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2013

See all articles by Felipe Balmaceda

Felipe Balmaceda

Diego Portales University

Ronald D. Fischer

University of Chile - Center of Applied Economics (CEA)

Felipe Ramirez

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Date Written: June 10, 2013

Abstract

This paper shows that the effects of financial liberalization on the credit market of a small and capital constrained economy depend on the market structure of domestic banks prior to liberalization. Specifically, under perfect competition in the domestic credit market prior to liberalization, liberalization leads to lower domestic interest rates, in turn leading to increased credit penetration. However, when the initial market structure is one of imperfect competition, liberalization can lead to the exclusion of less wealthy entrepreneurs from the credit market. This provides a rationale for the mixed empirical evidence concerning the effects of liberalization on access to credit in developing markets. Moreover, the analysis provides new insights into the consequences of foreign lenders' entry into developing economies.

Keywords: Financial liberalization, imperfect competition, credit penetration

JEL Classification: G21, O16

Suggested Citation

Balmaceda, Felipe and Fischer, Ronald D. and Ramirez, Felipe, Financial Liberalization, Market Structure and Credit Penetration (June 10, 2013). Journal of Financial Intermediation, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2277242 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2277242

Felipe Balmaceda

Diego Portales University ( email )

Avda Santa Clara 797
Santiago, RM 8580000
Chile

HOME PAGE: http://https://works.bepress.com/felipe_balmaceda

Ronald D. Fischer (Contact Author)

University of Chile - Center of Applied Economics (CEA) ( email )

Republica 701
Casilla 2777
Santiago
Chile
+56/2/678 4055 (Phone)
+56/2/689 7895 (Fax)

Felipe Ramirez

University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )

Ronald O. Perelman Center for Political Science
133 South 36th Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
United States

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