Executive – Legislature Divide and Party Volatility in Emergent Democracies: Lessons For Democratic Performance from Taiwan
Japanese Journal of Political Science, 9 (3) 305-322, 2008
Posted: 25 Jun 2013
Date Written: Jan 2008
Abstract
Are new democracies with divided governments and volatile parties politically ill-fated? The literature suggests so, but cases of emergent democracies, such as Taiwan and Brazil that face both conditions, defy the prediction. This paper explains why: Party volatility follows from pursuing distinct executive and legislative agendas under divided governments; the political ambition that underlies these conditions sustains democratic and even political performance. We evaluate the argument through government spending in Taiwan. The results corroborate our expectations: they show more parties composing the legislature, as government spending favors an executive agenda and neglects a legislative welfare-spending agenda. The findings make three contributions to the literature: First, they reveal a political divide between executive and legislative branches, rather than ideological parties to undercut concerns regarding performance. Second, they demonstrate that the strategic use of government spending to institutionalize party development along an executive agenda fuels party fragmentation. Third, they show that legislators split, switch, or create alternative routes to office in reaction to strategic spending, to underscore that ambition underlies party volatility and a divided government.
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