The Competitive Effects of Transmission Capacity in a Deregulated Electricity Industry

Posted: 15 Jul 2000

See all articles by Severin Borenstein

Severin Borenstein

University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

James Bushnell

University of California - Energy Institute; University of California, Berkeley - Department of Industrial Engineering & Operations Research (IEOR)

Steven Stoft

Retired Economist

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Abstract

In an unregulated electricity generation market, the capacity of transmission lines will determine the degree to which generators in different locations compete with one another. We show, however, that there may be no relationship between the effect of a transmission line in spurring competition and the actual electricity flows on the line in equilibrium. We also demonstrate that limited transmission capacity can give a firm the incentive to restrict its output in order to congest transmission into its area of dominance. As a result, relatively small investments in transmission may yield surprisingly large payoffs in terms of increased competition. We demonstrate these effects in the context of the deregulated California electricity market.

JEL Classification: L52, L94

Suggested Citation

Borenstein, Severin and Bushnell, James B. and Stoft, Steven, The Competitive Effects of Transmission Capacity in a Deregulated Electricity Industry. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=228754

Severin Borenstein (Contact Author)

University of California, Berkeley - Economic Analysis & Policy Group ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
510-642-3689 (Phone)
707-885-2508 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

James B. Bushnell

University of California - Energy Institute ( email )

Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

University of California, Berkeley - Department of Industrial Engineering & Operations Research (IEOR)

IEOR Department
4135 Etcheverry Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

Steven Stoft

Retired Economist ( email )

2910 Elmwood Court
Berkeley, CA 94705
United States
(510) 644-9410 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://stoft.com

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