Great Expectations from Pension Fund Activism: Insights from an Emerging Market

Abstract

This study examines private pension funds' preferences for shareholder activism in Poland in closely-held firms that dominate stock exchanges in emerging markets. The results show that the major institutional investors engage in a limited spectrum of shareholder activities. Most often they seek to contact the company's management board members as well as supervisory board members if they are dissatisfied with a portfolio company. None of the funds even considers public criticism or litigation. The form of shareholder activism selected by different funds and the sequence do not vary substantially. The reasons lie in the internal benchmark. However, the largest pension funds tend to be more active than the rest. They choose low-cost and low-risk forms of activism, but they hardly participate in any corporate governance organizations. They avoid highly visible and confrontational activities.

Keywords: pension funds, institutional investors activism, emerging markets, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G34, G23, G28