An Agenda-Setting Theory of Electoral Competition

The Journal of Politics, 78 (4): 1170-1183

37 Pages Posted: 13 Jun 2017

See all articles by Tiberiu Dragu

Tiberiu Dragu

New York University

Xiaochen Fan

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics

Date Written: 2016

Abstract

The strategy of parties regarding which issues to emphasize during electoral campaigns is an important aspect of electoral competition. In this paper, we advance research on electoral competition by developing a multidimensional model of electoral competition in which parties compete for electoral support by raising the electoral salience of position issues. We show that parties have incentives to advertise an issue on which the opponent has a more popular position or an issue on which neither party has electoral advantage. We also show that the party with the lower equilibrium vote share prefers to emphasize more controversial issues, while the party with the higher equilibrium vote share prefers to emphasize more consensual issues on its electoral agenda. The analysis provides a theoretical foundation for moving toward a more complete understanding of the content of campaign communication on issues on which voters disagree about which policies ought to be implemented. It also provides novel empirical predictions about how the structure of public opinion impacts the campaign strategy of parties, which can foster further empirical research on electoral campaigns and issue-selection.

Keywords: electoral competition, agenda-setting, issue selection, position issues.

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Dragu, Tiberiu and Fan, Xiaochen, An Agenda-Setting Theory of Electoral Competition (2016). The Journal of Politics, 78 (4): 1170-1183, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2302004

Tiberiu Dragu (Contact Author)

New York University ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://wp.nyu.edu/tiberiu_dragu/

Xiaochen Fan

New York University (NYU) - Department of Economics ( email )

269 Mercer Street, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States

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