The Chilean Constitutional Court and the 2005 Reform: A Castling between Career Judges and Academics ("El Tribunal Constitucional chileno y la reforma de 2005. Un enroque entre jueces de carrera y académicos")

Revista de Derecho, Vol. XXVIII, N°1

22 Pages Posted: 3 Aug 2013 Last revised: 12 Jan 2021

See all articles by Diego G. Pardow

Diego G. Pardow

University of California at Berkeley, School of Law

Sergio Verdugo

IE University - IE Law School

Date Written: June 1, 2015

Abstract

Using an original methodology that mixes directional coding and Pritchett's correlations, this paper argues that the Chilean Constitutional Court is becoming more active in exercising its powers against the executive branch. We also argue, however, that any political analysis should proceed with caution. The trend has its origin in a constitutional reform in 2005 that substantially changed the mechanism to appoint the Court’s justices. However, the movement towards judicial activism seems to be related with the decreasing influence of the legalistic culture embodied in the Chilean judiciary and cannot be properly explained with classic attitudinal model.

Keywords: law & politics, judicial decision making, comparative constitutional law

JEL Classification: K19, K32, K42

Suggested Citation

Pardow, Diego G. and Verdugo, Sergio, The Chilean Constitutional Court and the 2005 Reform: A Castling between Career Judges and Academics ("El Tribunal Constitucional chileno y la reforma de 2005. Un enroque entre jueces de carrera y académicos") (June 1, 2015). Revista de Derecho, Vol. XXVIII, N°1, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2305426 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2305426

Diego G. Pardow (Contact Author)

University of California at Berkeley, School of Law ( email )

215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States

Sergio Verdugo

IE University - IE Law School ( email )

Madrid
Spain

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.ie.edu/law-school/

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