Crowding Out of Solidarity? – Public Health Insurance versus Informal Transfer Networks in Ghana

46 Pages Posted: 7 Aug 2013 Last revised: 13 Aug 2013

See all articles by Florian Klohn

Florian Klohn

University of Duisburg-Essen

Christoph Strupat

Ruhr Graduate School in Economics (RGS econ)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: July 1, 2013

Abstract

This paper delivers empirical evidence on how informal transfers are affected by a formal and country-wide health insurance scheme. Using the fifth wave of the Ghanaian Living Standard Household Survey, we investigate the extent to which the exogenous implementation of the National Health Insurance Scheme affects the probability of making or receiving informal transfers and their monetary equivalents. Our findings suggest that there is a significant crowding out of informal transfers. Members of weak transfer networks and individuals that run an enterprise are inclined to reduce their amount of remittances. We conclude that the provision of formal health insurance can reduce covariate risk in weak transfer networks and support business owners that are confronted by strong sharing obligations.

Keywords: Public health insurance, informal transfer networks, crowding out, Ghana

JEL Classification: I13, I15, O12

Suggested Citation

Klohn, Florian and Strupat, Christoph, Crowding Out of Solidarity? – Public Health Insurance versus Informal Transfer Networks in Ghana (July 1, 2013). Ruhr Economic Paper No. 432, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2306951 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2306951

Florian Klohn

University of Duisburg-Essen ( email )

Lotharstrasse 1
Duisburg, 47048
Germany

Christoph Strupat (Contact Author)

Ruhr Graduate School in Economics (RGS econ) ( email )

Hohenzollernstr. 1-3
Essen, NRW 45128
Germany
0049-201-8149-509 (Phone)

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