Rewarding Volunteers: A Field Experiment - Online Appendix

22 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2013

See all articles by Nicola Lacetera

Nicola Lacetera

University of Toronto - Strategic Management; University of Toronto at Mississauga - Department of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Mario Macis

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Robert Slonim

The University of Sydney; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: August 28, 2013

Abstract

This is an online appendix to Lacetera, N., Macis, M., and Slonim, R., 2013: “Rewarding Volunteers? A Field Experiment“ (Management Science, forthcoming). It contains the following materials: (1) Additional Details of the Experimental Design (pp. i-iii), and (2) Additional Analyses (pp. iv-xxii).).

Keywords: field experiments, altruism,incentives, blood donation, spillovers, displacement

JEL Classification: C93, D01, D03, D64, H41, I12

Suggested Citation

Lacetera, Nicola and Macis, Mario and Slonim, Robert, Rewarding Volunteers: A Field Experiment - Online Appendix (August 28, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2314008 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2314008

Nicola Lacetera

University of Toronto - Strategic Management ( email )

Canada

University of Toronto at Mississauga - Department of Management

Canada

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Mario Macis (Contact Author)

Johns Hopkins University - Carey Business School ( email )

100 International Drive
Baltimore, MD 21202
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Robert Slonim

The University of Sydney ( email )

University of Sydney
Sydney, NSW 2006
Australia

IZA Institute of Labor Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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