Optimal Pricing and Quality of Academic Journals and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Forced Open Access: A Two-Sided Model
Munich Discussion Paper No. 2013-10
28 Pages Posted: 26 Aug 2013
There are 3 versions of this paper
Optimal Pricing and Quality of Academic Journals and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Forced Open Access: A Two-Sided Model
Optimal Pricing and Quality of Academic Journals and the Ambiguous Welfare Effects of Forced Open Access: A Two-Sided Model
Date Written: August 21, 2013
Abstract
We analyze optimal pricing and quality of a monopolistic journal and the optimality of open access in a two-sided model. The predominant aspect of the model that determines the quality levels at which open access is optimal is the nature of the (non-linear) externalities between readers and authors in a journal. We show that there exist scenarios in which open access is a feature of high-quality journals. Besides, we find that the removal of copyright (and thus forced open access) will likely increase both readership and authorship, will decrease journal profi ts, and may increase social welfare.
Keywords: Two-sided markets, academic journals, open access, removal of copyright, welfare effects
JEL Classification: L11, L82, O34
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation