Team versus Individual Play in Finitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games
32 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2013 Last revised: 13 Mar 2015
Date Written: March 6, 2015
Abstract
In finitely repeated prisoner dilemma games, two-person teams start out with significantly less cooperation than individuals, consistent with results reported in the social psychology literature. However, safety concerns quickly give way to teams cooperating significantly more than individuals. Team dialogues show significant discrepancies between beliefs and those underlying leading rational cooperation models. Cooperation is sustained by its higher payoff in conjunction with limited unraveling due to common knowledge of rationality breaking down at a fundamental level - failure to account for others learning to think about defecting like they do.
Keywords: finitely repeated prisoner dilemma games, team play versus individuals, limited rationality
JEL Classification: D03, C92, C73
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation