Team versus Individual Play in Finitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games

32 Pages Posted: 28 Aug 2013 Last revised: 13 Mar 2015

See all articles by John H. Kagel

John H. Kagel

Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics

Peter McGee

University of Arkansas

Date Written: March 6, 2015

Abstract

In finitely repeated prisoner dilemma games, two-person teams start out with significantly less cooperation than individuals, consistent with results reported in the social psychology literature. However, safety concerns quickly give way to teams cooperating significantly more than individuals. Team dialogues show significant discrepancies between beliefs and those underlying leading rational cooperation models. Cooperation is sustained by its higher payoff in conjunction with limited unraveling due to common knowledge of rationality breaking down at a fundamental level - failure to account for others learning to think about defecting like they do.

Keywords: finitely repeated prisoner dilemma games, team play versus individuals, limited rationality

JEL Classification: D03, C92, C73

Suggested Citation

Kagel, John H. and McGee, Peter, Team versus Individual Play in Finitely Repeated Prisoner Dilemma Games (March 6, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317147 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2317147

John H. Kagel

Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics ( email )

1945 North High Street
Columbus, OH 43210-1172
United States

Peter McGee (Contact Author)

University of Arkansas ( email )

Fayetteville, AR 72701
United States

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